Yes, I did have a different scenario in mind, but it doesn’t matter. Your illustration is good enough, and I’ll stop with the questions at this point.

The points I am making are these:

First, a one-hand/other-hand seesaw: I believe there is objective truth (that house is white). However, only subjective viewpoints of that objective truth exist (that house looked white to me yesterday). There can be a preponderance of viewpoints that gives us an effective objective truth (thousands of people drive by that house, and say that it’s white), but if enough viewpoints disagree, then I believe the truth is necessarily in question (several hundred actually said it was black).

It can get more complicated. These viewpoints are themselves an objective truth of which we have a limited view (okay, I didn’t really talk to all those thousands of people; I only asked five, who all said it was white). The viewpoints could be of varying certainty (these 100 didn’t really get a good look at the house), detail (some saw a different color for the trim), and credibility (some said it was red, just to spread FUD… we think).

When you put this all together, you find that there’s so much you don’t know, that you -have- to fill in the gaps with something in order to make a decision. That’s where your beliefs come in.

If your decision requires some imposition on other people, then the acceptance of that decision is partially a function of how well your beliefs coincide with theirs.

Finally, right and wrong don’t really have any play here. We can’t say this decision was right, or that one was wrong. I can say I believe this is right and that is wrong, but I can’t know for sure, because I know that I know so little. Someone else can say a different decision is right, and my gut tells me not that they’re wrong, but that they might know something I don’t. Or believe something I don’t.

These are, to me, some of the underpinnings of moderacy.

I’m not real clear on how a particular belief, specifically “enforcing” that belief, would be “vital to your survival.” Lack of imagination on my part, no doubt. Perhaps you could give an example of what you have in mind.

The best I could come up with is global warming. Now if global warming is happening, there will be impacts on humanity. But survival? If the sea levels rise several yards, a lot of low level land becomes uninhabitable (arguably all of Florida, for example) — but there is no obvious reason peole living there could not migrate to the new shoreline. Similarly, climate change would make some current agricultural areas a lot less productive; but also allow agriculture in some areas which are currently too cold. Economic problems, sure, even massive ones. But a survival threat seems over the top.

Not to say that there isn’t a climate change problem, or that no steps should be taken to attempt to address the issue. Just that I don’t see anyone arguing for changes, based on their belief in global warming, who is at risk of death. (And, no doubt, you had a different scenario in mind anyway. :-) )

wj: what if you quickly fit conflicting data into your theory, but for some reason (lack of time, lack of talent, et al.) you are unable to communicate that understanding? And what if enforcing that understanding, that belief, via communication or coercion, is vital to your survival?

In other news, I suspect you have very little stake in whether or not life exists on Pluto. :-) Which I reckon was partially your point.

And my response to that concern is simply this: If what you believe is informed by the data, then you witness for that belief by acknowledging when new data conflicts with something else that you believe to be true. This is a matter of being true to yourself. It takes priority over persuading others.

And if you desire to persuade others, how you get them to listen to you (or resume listening to you), and how you convince them once you do, are separate questions. Whether you acknowledge data that conflicts or not, you will still have the issue of how you get people to listen. And, I would suggest, refusal to acknowledge conflicting data will not help that effort.

Once you get a hearing, how do you convince someone? I would suggest that starting with the data is a good place to start. Will it work with everyone? No, refusal to look at the data is not the exclusive behavior of any one side of any issue. But the only people you have a realistic chance of convincing are those with at least somewhat open minds. And data has a better chance with those people than simple (especially conflicting) belief — no matter how fervently put forward.

By believing I meant pretending to yourself that you know for sure something that can’t be known for sure. Of course people must proceed on assumptions and premises. But I think that ultimate uncertainty is there, and fanaticism is shadow evidence for it: only if you deeply doubt would you need to absolutely believe.

Aztec society is probably a poor example of a “unified and egalitarian, “tribal” society. They may not have had much scientific knowledge by our standards, but it was a rather advanced and stratified civilization. The priests had a lot of the power, and for all we know they could sacrifice that mother’s child to the gods whether she assented or not.

Meanwhile, I agree: if some data contradicts your data, it does not necessarily follow that your data is wrong. It also does not necessarily follow that your data is right. This implies that nothing quite follows from this contradiction. (Interestingly, in classical logic, all statements follow from contradiction. But this is not that kind of contradiction; the data in question here are not fully descriptive, and are not in actual contradiction; more information is needed to tell what is really true. Which is a windbag way of saying what you said.)

Back to your comment, then: what if your audience has stopped listening to you before you’ve had a chance to defend your theory?

wj: “First, if the data says that you were wrong, admit it. In addition to being honest, it actually should suggest that you are more likely to be right on the ones you still support.” …what if it does not suggest that?

“Second, point out that whether something is correct or not does not depend on who supports it but on the data.” …my question is the same as that to Meredith: what if your audience has stopped listening to you?

Your third point jibes well with points one and two, and so I won’t question it until you’ve had a chance to answer my questions to one and two.

Your last paragraph made me smile. The point about the adversary doing one side’s thinking for it had not yet occurred to me in that form.

First, if the data says that you were wrong, admit it. In addition to being honest, it actually should suggest that you are more likely to be right on the ones you still support.
Second, point out that whether something is correct or not does not depend on who supports it but on the data.
Third, point out that, if there is evidence that contradicts your other positions, those who disagree have an obligation to bring it forward — since you have just demonstrated your willingness to consider new information. AND, if they do not do so, that suggests that there is no such information — since otherwise, why aren’t they bringing it up? Which is not likely to convert them, but may help sway others. ;-)

Admittedly, the “I detest X, so anything X does is, by definition, dispicable” position is all too common. But since it is easy, and avoids the need to actually think, it is likely to remain popular. (I have to wonder if the people who think like this ever stop to think that they are allowing the person they hate to do their thinking for them. Because they obviously are.)

Just because A is weaker does not at all mean that B and C are weaker, unless A is a part of, or has some substantial relation to B and C.

“Invalid reasoning (in my belief), but nevertheless, data indicates that this reasoning is followed frequently.”

Maybe that “data” is wrong, or maybe just because people use extremely flawed reasoning does not make that reasoning legitimate. Also missing from the analysis here is the fact that just because there is contradictory data, it doesn’t mean that your data is wrong, and it doesn’t necessarily mean that A is weaker. There is almost always contradictory data to be found on any given piece of data, unless you’re talking about something that has been accepted as fact, and even then . . . . Therefore, contradictory data just doesn’t have to mean that much anymore. End result – I may make a logical argument for flatly rejecting your data, and I don’t have to give in on A in the first place.

- you support A, B, C
- A is weaker
- therefore, B and C are weaker.

Invalid reasoning (in my belief), but nevertheless, data indicates that this reasoning is followed frequently. So what do you do? What do you do, especially if A wasn’t really as important to you as B and C? Do you equivocate on A, and admit that A isn’t able to explain everything, and then take the hit on B and C?

Again – and this hits a little on the “religious doctrine” of your last response – what if B and C are -really- important to you?

In slightly more general terms, how do you handle your reasoning in the face of reasoning that is not valid (at least, not in your system)?

Personally, if I have data that don’t fit one of my theories, I have two choices:
1) spend some time trying to come up with a theory that does fit,
2) meanwhile, use the existing theories for those areas where they are “good enough.” An example being Newtonian mechanics — Einstein’s formulation is a better fit for more of the data, but Newton’s is still sufficient for an enormous number of situations (and a LOT easier to use).
But data which don’t fit one theory do not necessarily impact another. When geology finally accepted plate tectonics it made no difference to theories of stellar evolution.

But perhaps you were thinking of a religious doctrine, which is suspect if any part of it doesn’t fit the data. Well, here are some possibilities (if you aren’t going to just ingore the data):
- change religions. OK, a hard choice, but obviously an option for some people.
- change sects. Most religions have both absolute literalist sects and others which take a more figurative view.
- discover that many religious figures spoke with analogies, the references of which were clear to the listeners, have been lost over time. (To take just one example: Did you know that 2000 years ago The Eye of the Needle was the name of a gate into Jeruselum — but a very low one? And a camel _could_ get through it, but only on its knees. Which gives a whole different view of how Jesus thought a rich man might get into heaven.)

If I’ve missed your point, please elucidate.

And one of the differences is that belief divides, while knowledge unites.

Amba, whatever the metaphysical merits of your diatribe, I don’t think this position is really supportable. As evidence, you merely point to the earth resolving around the sun. That scientific truth in fact did not have a unifying effect, but a rather divisive-disintigrative effect. The fact that modern people can now nod their heads in agreement over basic science is hardly supportive of the “unifying” effect of knowledge. Knowledge is power and, in case you haven’t noticed, the power (and wealth) differential is exaggerated in modern (and by definition “scientifically knowledgable”) societies. Please compare this with tribal societies with relatively little scientific knowledge — much more unified and equalitarian. What is the unifying element of such tribal societies, 1) survival and 2) belief. The Aztec mothers would willing sacrifice their children for the harvest gods — now that is the definition of unifying. No great knowledge there.

[B]elieving is not the same as knowing. And one of the differences is that belief divides, while knowledge unites. There are some things that are self-evident: nobody argues over whether the sun comes up in the morning and goes down at night. And there are some things that have been proven beyond question: even the Vatican now agrees that the earth goes around the sun, and not vice versa, as our naked senses tell us. We call those facts. But a belief is a guess about a mystery, defended so fiercely because of its very uncertainty.

Okay, next question. Suppose there is additional data indicating that if you admit your theories do not explain all of the non-fitting data, then all of the theories you have been promoting will be brought into question. What shall you do then?

(Full disclosure: I guess I should say that I am being purposefully naive here. :-) )

The requirement is not omniscience. Just honesty about what the data is and where it does not appear to fit.