Comments on: Everybody Agrees, George Tenet’s A Putz http://donklephant.com/2007/05/01/everybody-agrees-tenets-a-putz/ Big Teeth. Huge Ass. Surprisingly Reasonable. Tue, 14 Feb 2012 14:03:13 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2.1 By: probligo http://donklephant.com/2007/05/01/everybody-agrees-tenets-a-putz/comment-page-1/#comment-318987 probligo Tue, 01 May 2007 18:30:48 +0000 http://donklephant.com/2007/05/01/everybody-agrees-tenets-a-putz/#comment-318987 Justin, does your feeling of "anti-Tenet" include his being more culpable for the decisions relating to "go to war in Iraq" than those who made the decision? If the Captain's comment - a history that I have not heard until now but which I am prepared to accept for the moment - traces the pre-9/11 events then that might well be justified. But I really want to toss the converse to you. Does Tenet really matter? Is his story going to have the impact of Watergate? I very much doubt that it will. There is still too much patriotism and politics driving rather than there being any rampant anti-Bush movement. What then is the reason for the book? As you have pointed out, it is his personal golden parachute. Justin, does your feeling of “anti-Tenet” include his being more culpable for the decisions relating to “go to war in Iraq” than those who made the decision?

If the Captain’s comment – a history that I have not heard until now but which I am prepared to accept for the moment – traces the pre-9/11 events then that might well be justified.

But I really want to toss the converse to you.

Does Tenet really matter? Is his story going to have the impact of Watergate? I very much doubt that it will. There is still too much patriotism and politics driving rather than there being any rampant anti-Bush movement. What then is the reason for the book? As you have pointed out, it is his personal golden parachute.

]]> By: Capt Haddock http://donklephant.com/2007/05/01/everybody-agrees-tenets-a-putz/comment-page-1/#comment-318984 Capt Haddock Tue, 01 May 2007 18:11:35 +0000 http://donklephant.com/2007/05/01/everybody-agrees-tenets-a-putz/#comment-318984 To the credit of Mr Tenet, his version of pre 09/11 History seems to be confirmed by an article from the french newspaper "Le Monde" published by Guillaume Dasquié on monday 16 April 2007, titled:""September 11, 2001: The French Knew Much About It". I quote: "As of January 2001, the al-Qaeda leadership nonetheless showed itself to be transparent to the eyes - and ears - of French spies. The redactors even detailed disagreements among the terrorists over the practical modalities of the planned hijacking. They never questioned their intention. Provisionally, the jihadists favored capturing an airplane between Frankfurt and the United States. They established a list of seven possible companies. Two would finally be chosen by the September 11 pirates: American Airlines and United Airlines. In his introduction, the author of the memo notes, "According to the Uzbek intelligence services, the airplane hijacking plan seems to have been discussed at the beginning of 2000 during a Kabul meeting of representatives from Osama bin Laden's organization...." Consequently, Uzbek spies informed French agents. At the time, the opposition of Muslim fundamentalists to the pro-American regime in Tashkent united the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the MIO. A military faction of this group, led by a certain Taher Yudachev, joined the Afghanistan camps and swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden, promising him he would export his jihad to Central Asia. MIO military leaflets and correspondence discovered in al-Qaeda's Afghan camps attest to that. Alain Chouet remembers this episode. Until October 2002, he directed the Security Intelligence Service, a DGSE subdivision charged with following terrorist movements. According to him, the credibility of the Uzbek channel devolves from the alliances formed by General Rashid Dostom, one of the main Afghan warlords, himself of Uzbek ethnicity, who was then fighting the Taliban. To please his protectors in the neighboring Uzbek security services, Dostom infiltrated some of his men into the heart of the MIO, right up to the command structures of the al-Qaeda camps. That's how he informed his friends in Tashkent, knowing that the intelligence would then make its way to Washington, London and Paris." end of quote. An other quote: " In its memo, the DGSE finally deems that al-Qaeda's desire to execute its act of piracy against an American airplane was absolutely certain: "During the month of October 2000, Osama bin Laden attended a meeting in Afghanistan during which the decision in principle to conduct this operation was sustained." It's January 5, 2001; The dice have been thrown; the French know it.... And they are not the only ones. As with all intelligence mentioning risks against American interests, the memo was passed on to the CIA by the DGSE's service for foreign relations, responsible for cooperation between allies (since renamed liaisons service). Its first recipient is Paris CIA Station Head Bill Murray, a French speaker with a John Wayne physique, since returned to the United States. We were able to make contact, but Mr. Murray did not want to respond to our requests. Pierre-Antoine Lorenzi, whose responsibilities at the DGSE then covered questions relative to cooperation with foreign agencies, cannot conceive that the intelligence should not have been handed over to him. "That is typically the type of information that is passed along to the CIA. It would even have been a professional error not to have done so." end of quote. I am very surprised that nobody in the U.S. reacted to this paper .... To the credit of Mr Tenet, his version of pre 09/11 History seems to be confirmed by an article from the french newspaper “Le Monde” published by Guillaume Dasquié on monday 16 April 2007, titled:”"September 11, 2001: The French Knew Much About It”.
I quote: “As of January 2001, the al-Qaeda leadership nonetheless showed itself to be transparent to the eyes – and ears – of French spies. The redactors even detailed disagreements among the terrorists over the practical modalities of the planned hijacking. They never questioned their intention. Provisionally, the jihadists favored capturing an airplane between Frankfurt and the United States. They established a list of seven possible companies. Two would finally be chosen by the September 11 pirates: American Airlines and United Airlines. In his introduction, the author of the memo notes, “According to the Uzbek intelligence services, the airplane hijacking plan seems to have been discussed at the beginning of 2000 during a Kabul meeting of representatives from Osama bin Laden’s organization….” Consequently, Uzbek spies informed French agents. At the time, the opposition of Muslim fundamentalists to the pro-American regime in Tashkent united the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the MIO. A military faction of this group, led by a certain Taher Yudachev, joined the Afghanistan camps and swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden, promising him he would export his jihad to Central Asia. MIO military leaflets and correspondence discovered in al-Qaeda’s Afghan camps attest to that. Alain Chouet remembers this episode. Until October 2002, he directed the Security Intelligence Service, a DGSE subdivision charged with following terrorist movements. According to him, the credibility of the Uzbek channel devolves from the alliances formed by General Rashid Dostom, one of the main Afghan warlords, himself of Uzbek ethnicity, who was then fighting the Taliban. To please his protectors in the neighboring Uzbek security services, Dostom infiltrated some of his men into the heart of the MIO, right up to the command structures of the al-Qaeda camps. That’s how he informed his friends in Tashkent, knowing that the intelligence would then make its way to Washington, London and Paris.”
end of quote.
An other quote: ” In its memo, the DGSE finally deems that al-Qaeda’s desire to execute its act of piracy against an American airplane was absolutely certain: “During the month of October 2000, Osama bin Laden attended a meeting in Afghanistan during which the decision in principle to conduct this operation was sustained.” It’s January 5, 2001; The dice have been thrown; the French know it…. And they are not the only ones. As with all intelligence mentioning risks against American interests, the memo was passed on to the CIA by the DGSE’s service for foreign relations, responsible for cooperation between allies (since renamed liaisons service). Its first recipient is Paris CIA Station Head Bill Murray, a French speaker with a John Wayne physique, since returned to the United States. We were able to make contact, but Mr. Murray did not want to respond to our requests. Pierre-Antoine Lorenzi, whose responsibilities at the DGSE then covered questions relative to cooperation with foreign agencies, cannot conceive that the intelligence should not have been handed over to him. “That is typically the type of information that is passed along to the CIA. It would even have been a professional error not to have done so.”
end of quote.

I am very surprised that nobody in the U.S. reacted to this paper ….

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