UK Defense Secretary Talks Cheney And Iraq Failures
By Justin Gardner | Related entries in History, The World, WarInteresting article from the BBC…
A catalogue of errors over planning for Iraq after the invasion, and an inability to influence key figures in the US administration, led to anarchy in Iraq from which the country has not recovered, the British defence secretary during the invasion admits today.In an exclusive interview with the Guardian, Geoff Hoon reveals that Britain disagreed with the US administration over two key decisions in May 2003, two months after the invasion - to disband Iraq’s army and “de-Ba’athify” its civil service. Mr Hoon also said he and other senior ministers completely underestimated the role and influence of the vice-president, Dick Cheney.
“Sometimes … Tony had made his point with the president, and I’d made my point with Don [Rumsfeld] and Jack [Straw] had made his point with Colin [Powell] and the decision actually came out of a completely different place. And you think: what did we miss? I think we missed Cheney.”
Frustrating to hear these things after the fact, but certainly telling. The ideologues forced us into a war with poor planning because they wanted to invade Iraq since the early 90s.
Be they Republican or Democrat, I certainly hope we pick a better team next time.
This entry was posted on Thursday, May 3rd, 2007 and is filed under History, The World, War. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.
May 3rd, 2007 at 5:36 pm
Any attempt to integrate the Baath party into the military would have led to a defection by Kurdistan, and a boycot by shiites to sign up for the security forces. At least thats what Bremmer said, and though he was a f@#% up, I have no reason do doubt him on this.
May 4th, 2007 at 1:38 pm
It would have been entirely possible (not to mention sensible) to tell the Iraqi military: “Those who return to their barracks will continue to be paid. Those who continue to fight will continue to be shot.” Which would have avoided leaving thousands of unemployed and armed young men rattling around the countryside.
As for the Baath (as separate issue from the military), the obvious move there would have been to say: “Individuals who committed crimes/attrocities during the previous regime will be brought to trial as individuals. But we realize that mere membership in the Baath Party may be no more than a reflection of a requirement for a government post. So it will not, in itself, be a cause for action.” Which would have left the governmental infrastructure (outside the secret police, etc.) in place and able to keep the country minimally functional.
The Kurds would almost certainly have been willing to live with that level a “accomodation” to the members of the old regime. Especially if sanctions agains those who did perpetrate attrocities were actually forthcoming. And the Shiites likewise, as long as they got to move into the security services and other parts fo the government.
What we actually did can only be described as massive, culpable stupidity.