The Story of Tora Bora
By Montag | Related entries in Bad Decisions, Military, The War On TerrorismThis is what John Kerry was always on about during the campaign.
Mary Anne Weaver told the story of Tora Bora in yesterday’s New York Times article:
Even after the arrival of the Special Forces, the Afghan militias were making little headway in their efforts to assault the Qaeda caves – largely as a result of heavier resistance than they had expected – despite having launched simultaneous attacks from the east, west and north. They had sent none of their forces to the south, where the highest peaks of the White Mountains are bisected by the border with Pakistan. The commanders, according to news reports, argued vehemently among themselves on what the conditions on the southern side of the mountain were: some insisted it was uncrossable, closed in by snow; other commanders were far less sure.
[Snipped: Two paragraphs about a request from Brig. Gen. James N. Mattis to deploy more troops to the Tora Bora area and Pakistan border which was denied, and later regretted as "...the gravest error of the war."]
A week or so after General Mattis’s request was denied, the turning point in the battle of Tora Bora came. It was Dec. 12. [Leader of the Afghan militia forces helping US special forces] Hajji Zaman had by now realized that the Qaeda fighters were better armed than his men and that they were also prepared to die rather than surrender to him. He was also becoming increasingly irritated with Hazarat Ali and with the snow. And in a few days the feast of Eid al-Fitr, which ends Ramadan, would begin. The stalemate, the Americans’ surrogate commander decided, simply had to end. So, through a series of intermediaries and then directly, Hajji Zaman made radio contact with some of bin Laden’s commanders and offered a cease-fire. The Americans were furious. The negotiations – to which Hazarat Ali [anoter leader of Afghan militia forces,] acquiesced since he, too, was now holding secret talks with Al Qaeda – continued for hours. By the time they came to an end, Hajji Zaman’s interlocutor, hidden somewhere in the caves above, was probably bin Laden’s son Salah Uddin. If the Qaeda forces surrendered, Hajji Zaman’s contact said, it would be only to the United Nations. Then he requested additional time to meet with other commanders. He would be back in touch by 8 the following morning, the younger bin Laden said.
American intelligence officials now believe that some 800 Qaeda fighters escaped Tora Bora that night. Others had already left; still others stayed behind, including bin Laden. “You’ve got to give him credit,” Gary Schroen, a former C.I.A. officer who led the first American paramilitary team into Afghanistan in 2001, told me. “He stayed in Tora Bora until the bitter end.” By the time the Afghan militias advanced to the last of the Tora Bora caves, no one of any significance remained: about 20 bedraggled young men were taken prisoner that day, Dec. 17.
On or about Dec. 16, 2001, according to American intelligence estimates, bin Laden left Tora Bora for the last time, accompanied by bodyguards and aides. Other Qaeda leaders dispersed by different routes, but bin Laden and his men are believed to have journeyed on horseback directly south toward Pakistan, crossing through the same mountain passes and over the same little-known smugglers’ trails through which the C.I.A.’s convoys passed during the jihad years. And all along the route, in the dozens of villages and towns on both sides of the frontier, the Pashtun tribes would have lighted campfires along the way to guide the horsemen as they slowly continued through the snow and on toward the old Pakistani military outpost of Parachinar.
The entire article is a quite interesting read.
New York Times: Lost at Tora Bora
This entry was posted on Monday, September 12th, 2005 and is filed under Bad Decisions, Military, The War On Terrorism. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.
September 12th, 2005 at 1:56 pm
I’m curious which Kerry that was. I don’t recall reading that he had been going on and on in the summer of 2004 about there not having been enough troops in Afghanistan in December 2001.
September 12th, 2005 at 2:56 pm
I remember it well.
This is how Melanie Kirkpatrick characterized the frequency of Kerry’s Tora Bora “formulation.” (From the October 14, 2004 WSJ op-ed page.):
Tora Bora Baloney
When documents were released ths past March that told what happened in Tora Bora, this is what CNN said about the frequency of Kerry’s campaign assertions:
CNN.com: Document suggests bin Laden escaped at Tora Bora
And here is one example of Kerry making such an assertion from the first Presidential debate:
Presidential Debate Between President Bush and Sen. John F. Kerry
September 12th, 2005 at 3:29 pm
But the entire operation in Afghanistan relied largely on cooperation with local forces and in letting the people of Afghanistan feel they were freeing themselves, not being invaded. That’s part of the reason it worked as it did. Unfortunately, in this case, it appears to have allowed Bin Laden to slip away. But I don’t think the idea was wrong in principle. It’s easy to say so in hindsight. That hardly is leadership, though. The U.S. stuck with a plan that worked for one play too many.
It’s not “outsourcing” if they’re in their own country. It’s the same thing we should be trying to do in Iraq; give the locals real control and authority.
March 1st, 2006 at 10:47 am
Kerry is right. Bush as commander in chief must have been watching closely. It was Bush’s call whether to allow the cease fire that allowed Osama to escape. Bush could have stopped it at any time but didn’t. There is something very fishy about this. Five years later Bush promises again to catch Osama, but when he had him, he let him go. Why?
September 10th, 2006 at 3:24 pm
Not only is Kerry a moron, but so are the people that agree with him. Bush didn’t “outsource” anything. I doubt that Kerry or any of the people aligned with him even understand what the mission of US Special Forces is. You do know it was SOCOM that commanded that mission, right? SOCOM… as in Special Operations Command… as in the people who command US Special Forces… as in the people who train and prepare indigenous militias… How could Bush have stopped the cease-fire when the cease-fire was dealt by AFGHANS?? WOW, some civilians are so retarded…
August 28th, 2007 at 9:21 pm
US nor the entire world army can beat this army, Tora Bora is the land of martyrs and victors, it shall never be conquered.
buying out warlords blah blah or making the poor population feel whatever you want would not change anything, why dont you realise even with such limited resources your world armies cannot end this struggle.
in the glare of burning churches you shall see the word Jihad!