Iraq Justification Revisited
By Callimachus | Related entries in The War On TerrorismTigerhawk resurrects the work of Steven Den Beste, one of the first erudite neo-con bloggers (USS Clueless), explaining the big picture of the war on Islamism and the place of Iraq in it. The extensive summary of America’s position in 2003 was more comprehensive and informed than anything the White House had managed to lay out (or really has since), and it was widely linked.
Two years down the road, Tigerhawk, himself a formidable blogging voive on the right-center, revisits this “high level strategic view of the cause of the war,” and adds his observations and annotations to bring the document up to date:
Whatever might be said about the success of the war in Iraq compared to the standard of history, it has been at best a qualified success — and many opponents of the war call it an unqualified failure, or worse — compared to the standard set by its most optimistic advocates in early 2003. So where do we stand? … The object of this post, then, is to organize my thinking about the war in light of what we knew then and what we now know.
If you want to cut to the chase, skip down, in the outline form, to item 7, “Stage 2: Iraq”
Whatever the links between Saddam and the Islamists, they were tentative. Saddam did support terrorists, but primarily those aimed at Israel. However, once the United States was on the offensive against al Qaeda, it is foolish to suppose that such an implacable enemy as Saddam would not have supported them, and vice versa. If the far more rational government in Tehran is crossing the Shia-Sunni divide to treat with al Qaeda, it is very likely that Saddam would have had we not turned our attention to Iraq so quickly after the elimination of the Taliban.
…
To make a significant long term change in the psychology of the “Arab Street”
To prove to the “Arab Street” that we were willing to fight, and that our reputation for cowardice was undeserved.
To prove that we are extraordinarily dangerous when we do fight, and that it is extremely unwise to provoke us.
To defeat the spirit of the “Arab Street”. To force them to face their own failure, so that they would become willing to consider the idea that reform could lead them to success. No one can solve a problem until they acknowledge that they have a problem, and until now the “Arab Street” has been hiding from theirs, in part aided by government propaganda eager to blame others elsewhere (especially the Jews).
To “nation build”. After making the “Arab Street” truly face its own failure, to show the “Arab Street” a better way by creating a secularized, liberated, cosmopolitan society in a core Arab nation. To create a place where Arabs were free, safe, unafraid, happy and successful. To show that this could be done without dictators or monarchs. (I’ve been referring to this as being the pilot project for “Arab Civilization 2.0″.)
Not confirmed: It may have been hoped that the conquered nation would serve as a honey-pot to attract militants from the region, causing them to fight against our troops instead of planning attacks against civilians. (This was described by David Warren as the “flypaper strategy”.) It seems to have worked out that way, but it’s not known if this was a deliberate part of the plan.
Tigerhawk’s insertions at this point begin, in parentheses:
[If it were deliberate, then the Bush administration botched it horribly. The poor preparation for a counterinsurgency after the end of major military operations seems to suggest that the "flypaper strategy" was no strategy at all, but an unforseen consequence. I depart from more dovish observers, though, in my view that it may be a fortuitous, even if bloody, unforseen consequence.] Many of the defenders who died in the war were not actually Iraqis. [Readers will recognize this as the "foreign fighter" controversy, and it still rages today because one's perception of the extent of foreign fighter intervention seems directly related to the political argument over American withdrawal. If the insurgency is essentially nationalistic, then the American presence probably exacerbates it. If, however, we have drawn al Qaeda into a strategic battle (even if by accident), then we would be tragically foolish to withdraw and hand al qaeda a victory even if our presence is otherwise feeding the nationalistic elements of the insurgency. My own view is that we are some distance from defeating the Sunni nationalists but that the Shia and the Kurds, acting through the government, will be able to contain it within the next few years. Al Qaeda, though, is on the run in Iraq. We have a chance to humiliate it if we chase it from the region. We must not let that chance slip by.]
Den Beste approves of the whole exercise, and comments:
This entry was posted on Monday, November 14th, 2005 and is filed under The War On Terrorism. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.The major trends in the GWOT are positive. Support for al Qaeda et al is falling. Counter-terror support in essential states like Saudi is increasing. Iraqi security forces have crossed into the geometric phase of growth in capability. The former-regime-elements + Jihadi forces are generating increasing alienation whilst their leadership is degrading. The U.S. nation-building leadership seems to be finally getting their act together. The U.S. military continues to adapt and get smarter. The morale and resolve of the U.S. troops is firm (a complete disconnect from U.S. polls).
So I would be short the insurgency and long the Iraqi democracy-on-training-wheels except for:
1) The fear that internal U.S. opposition will defeat a fundamentally good policy.
2) The fear that corruption and tribalism will defeat the efforts of the best of Iraqis (similarly for Afghanistan).
I believe corruption is a more serious 10-year threat than the current insurgency. While much external and internal effort is being invested to thwart the corruption threat, the outcome will be determined by the Iraqis.
But where we should have leverage, the U.S. political trends seem almost hopeless. The administration doesn’t seem able to communicate, and the opposition doesn’t seem to care about the damage they are doing. This is one of the few accurate parallels to the Vietnam case, and it’s not a happy one.
November 14th, 2005 at 9:22 pm
I think one of the correct Vietnam analogies is in the area of strategy. We began in Vietnam with a strategy of attrition, the famous “body count.” Toward the very end we shifted to a “take, hold and build” strategy using indigenous troops — Vietnamization. Some claim this would have been successful - eventually. But by then it was way too late to talk to the American people about “eventually.’ We’d had years and years of eventually.
In Iraq, same pattern, with the twist that we start off with no sttrategy at all because we had fooled ourselves into believing that Iraq would be France in 1944. We transitioned to a strategy of denial — the insurgents were a handful of dead-enders. Then we shifted to Vietnam Stage One: attrition. And now, finally, we are moving to a “take, hold and build” strategy using indigenous troops. The correct strategy. Too bad there is no indigenous army.
The problem with the “as they stand up, we stand down” slogan is that in order to stand up Iraqi troops we have to shift more of our people into training missions, which means they aren’t available for combat missions, which means the security situation deteriorates, so that we have even more desperate need for Iraqi troops and around and around we go. Bottom line: we ddon’t have a big enough army. As it is we need to draw down in order to preserve thee integrity of our force, while somehow training ever more Iraqis, even while the security situations spirals down.
That’s the problem here, in military terms. We never had enough men. We hit upon the correct strategy about two years late. And now we are in a trap.
And that’s not even getting into the political mess.
Vietnam was not the fault of the media — we had 500,000 men in Vietnam at the peak, and stayed for a decade. It was the fault of a hidebound military that did not get counterinsurgency warfare until far too late. The US military was configured for a tank war at the Fulda Gap in Germany, not for counterinsurgency.
Iraq is not the fault of the Dems or the media, it is the fault of ideologues and theorists — politicians and Pentagon civilians — who deliberately refused to heed our own vast experience with counterinsurgency warfare.
November 14th, 2005 at 9:52 pm
Whether our military masters counter-insurgency and urban warfare now, or later, it’s going to have to be done. Whether they get it in Iraq or the next place, they’re going to have to learn. The more battalion-leader-level experience we have at this, the better the chances of developing a working model. It seems we’re pretty close to it, in my opinion, based on what I read about Fallujah and Najaf.
That set-piece tank battle on open European plains, the replay of Kursk, is looking more and more remote every day. Might as well clear that playbook off the shelf.
None of that, for better or worse, brings Iraq truly closer to stability, of course. But I remain confident that that country has a critical mass of people who are determined enough to make it work to, well, make it work.
Michael, if it was just you and I and a box of beers, I’m sure we’d agree on most things. But I have an emotional notion that while the war is still on, the criticism of the chieftain is not as important as persisting in the fight. I am not trying to say my way is right or that it’s even rational. I’ll have a post on all that someday. I don’t think criticism is treason (just to head off the inevitable counter-post from the inevitable misreaders). But for me, I know what feels right. Maybe it’s the Scots-Irish in me. Maybe it’s the German.
November 15th, 2005 at 6:48 am
I have many of those same feelings. I’m an Army brat, my father a retired officer. But in this case I think criticism is necessary because something needs to be done or we may well lose. And at risk of quoting myself, Iraq has all of Vietnam’s quagmire potential and none of its strategic irrelevance. If we lose, this will be a disaster for us.
As you know, Lincoln was subjected to awful criticism throughout the war, including all sorts of Congressional meddling. I’m sure that made things difficult. On the other hand we finally got Grant and Sherman and Sheridan.
November 15th, 2005 at 8:21 am
“If the far more rational government in Tehran is crossing the Shia-Sunni divide to treat with al Qaeda, it is very likely that Saddam would have had we not turned our attention to Iraq so quickly after the elimination of the Taliban.”
Man, talk about non-sequitors. And poor arguments. Even if the analogy made the slightest bit of sense - which it doesn’t on its own terms - one is in pretty poor shape when one’s argument becomes “if we hadn’t attacked Iraq, Saddam might have started to aid Al-Qaeda.” Yes, that’s a great reason for treating Iraq as an imminent threat and throwing most of your military resources at it.
Are you seriously endorsing this as deep thinking on the War on Terror?
November 15th, 2005 at 12:04 pm
I don’t see the Vietnam analogy, other than the two points Cal mentioned. The South Vietnamese government was oppresive and unpopular. The vast majority of Iraqis support their government. South Vietnam itself had no strong national identity. Iraq has a strong national self image. Even though the conflict has transformed into something our president and military didn’t forsee, we seem to have stumbled upon a winning strategy against Al-Qaeda. The enemy is hemoraging public support in the Arab world.
I give Bush no credit for this, other than for being too bull-headed to back down from a fight - any fight. A part of me still wonders if he saw Iraq as a blotch on the Bush family honor and if that played a role in starting the war. I didn’t see any reason for us to get involved in Iraq, but it has turned out much better than I had expected. We’re winning in Iraq and in the Arab world in general. If Iraq can be compared to Vietnam, it’s Al-Qaeda’s Vietnam, not ours. They’re the ones losing the war of public opinion. The US can afford to lose the support of the Arab street (what else is new?). Al-Qaeda can’t.